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Introduction
While the Union Government finances show a degree 
of consolidation in the last couple of years, the financ-
es of State Governments show signs of increasing fiscal 
imbalance reflected in the levels of both revenue and 
fiscal deficits in large number of States. If we consid-
er all-State trends in State finances, it appears that all 
States’ fiscal deficit after a sharp reduction has started 
increasing in recent years. The RBI Study on State Fi-
nances for the year 2016-17 also observed that States 
started borrowing more in recent years compared to 
the period from 2005-06 to 2011-12 reflecting rising 
trend in fiscal imbalance at the all States level. Grow-
ing fiscal imbalance has the potential to derail fiscal 
consolidation at the general government level. 
Medium term fiscal challenges at the State level are 
many. The most important being the taking over of 
DISCOM liabilities under the UDAY scheme by the 
State governments resulting in an increase in deficit 
at the State level. Implications of UDAY in-terms of 
higher debt liability and interest outgo requires clear 
understanding, particularly when the impact is asym-
metric across States. It is also argued that potential 
fiscal risk due to farm loan waivers can really put 
pressure on the level of deficit. Though, the roll out 
of Goods and Services Tax (GST) from 1 July, 2017 is 
historic, benefits of GST would only start flowing in 
when the new tax system stabilizes. The medium term 
fiscal challenge would be to maintain fiscal balance, 
improve quality of fiscal deficit by reducing revenue 
deficit and make resources available for key priority 
areas of spending under social and economic services. 
Keeping these objectives in mind, this analysis on State 
finances has been prepared based on the 2017-18 State 
1 This excludes data relating to 2017-18 budget of Manipur. 
budgets for 28 States.1 The objective is to understand 
emerging issues in State finances based on State Bud-
gets 2017-18 in a comparative perspective, State-lev-
el fiscal policy stance and key sectoral spending. The 
other major objective of this exercise is also to have a 
fair understanding of the aggregate fiscal position of 
both Union and States for the current fiscal year.   
Finances of the Union and State Governments
Table 1 provides a comparative picture of the finances 
of the Union and State Governments for the period 
2011-12 to 2017-18BE. From the examination of key 
fiscal indicators, it is evident that between 2011-12 
and 2017-18BE, there has been an improvement in 
the finances of the Union Government with major fis-
cal parameters like revenue deficit, fiscal deficit, pri-
mary deficit and outstanding liabilities expressed as 
percentage of GDP. The revenue deficit of the union 
government as percent of GDP declined from 4.51 
per cent in 2011-12 to 2.51 per cent in 2015-16 and 
is budget to improve further to 1.91 per cent in 2017-
18BE, while fiscal deficit declined from 5.91 per cent 
to 3.24 per cent during the same period. The primary 
deficit also showed considerable improvement declin-
ing from 2.78 per cent in 2011-12 to 0.14 per cent in 
2017-18BE and outstanding liabilities as percentage of 
GDP declined from 51.71 per cent in 2011-12 to 47.27 
per cent in 2017-18BE.
The combined finances of the State governments, 
however, showed deterioration during this period (ta-
ble 1). We find a deterioration of the fiscal position 
of States since 2013-14. Surpluses in revenue account 
turned into deficit and we observe re-emergence of 
revenue deficit in 2013-14. The number of States hav














ing revenue deficit increased from 6 in 2011-12 to 11 
in 2013-14 and further to 15 in the following year. In 
2015-16, 10 states had deficit in their revenue account. 
Although the combined revenue account of all States 
show a small surplus to the tune of 0.03 per cent of 
GSDP in 2017-18BE (see fig 1), 8 States have budgeted 
for revenue deficit as can be seen from table 2. 
Fiscal deficit aggregated across States also deteriorat-
ed during this period. Fiscal deficit as percentage of 
GDP declined from 1.93 per cent in 2011-12 to 3.03 
per cent in 2015-16 and is budgeted to further decline 
to 3.67 per cent in 2016-17RE (fig 2). The FD-GDP 
ratio in 2015-16 exceeded the 3 per cent FRBM ceil
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Table 1: Finances of the Union and States
                  (% of GDP)





Union Government -4.51 -3.66 -3.18 -2.94 -2.51 -2.05 -1.91
State Governments 0.27 0.20 -0.09 -0.37 -0.04 -0.23 0.03
Fiscal Deficit
Union Government -5.91 -4.93 -4.48 -4.10 -3.89 -3.52 -3.24
State Governments -1.93 -1.97 -2.21 -2.63 -3.03 -3.67 -2.69
Primary Deficit
Union Government -2.78 -1.78 -1.14 -0.87 -0.67 -0.34 -0.14
State Governments -0.36 -0.45 -0.70 -1.01 -1.48 -1.99 -0.97
Outstanding Liabilities
Union Government 51.71 50.99 50.47 50.16 50.45 49.01 47.27
State Governments 22.34 21.80 21.40 21.49 22.83 23.91 24.10
Note: Surplus (+) / Deficit (-); GDP is at current prices (2011-12 series); Fiscal Deficit of States in 2015-16 and 2016-17BE includes 
DISCOM debt taken over by the States under UDAY; For 2016-17RE and 2017-18BE the data is for 28 States. As the 2017-18 budget 
of Manipur was not available, it could not be included in the analysis.
Source: 1) Union Government: Budget Documents (various years); 2) State Government: Finance Accounts (various years) and 
Budget Documents 2017-18; 3) Economic Survey 2016-17, Vol. 2.
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ing of fiscal prudence for the first time since 2004-05. 
High fiscal deficit in 2015-16 and 2016-17RE is on ac-
count of State governments taking over 75 per cent of 
the DISCOM debt under UDAY. If we exclude the 
UDAY liabilities the FD-GDP ratio would be around 
2.31 per cent in 2015-16 and 3.32 per cent in 2016-
17RE. Number of States having fiscal deficit greater 
that 3 percent, increased from 9 in 2011-12 to 14 in 
2014-15 and further to 19 in 2016-17RE as can be 
seen from table 3. In 2017-18, fiscal deficit of all States 
as percentage of GDP is budgeted to be around 2.69 
per cent (table 1) and 11 States have budgeted for FD-
GDP ratio greater than 3 percent.
The primary deficits of all States taken together also 
show deterioration with primary deficit as percentage 
of GDP increasing from 0.36 per cent in 2011-12 to 
1.99 per cent in 2016-17RE as evident from table 1. In 
2017-18BE, the primary deficit is budgeted to decline 
by more than 1 percentage points to 0.97 percent.
Outstanding liabilities aggregated across all States 
as per cent of GDP from 22.34 per cent in 2011-12 
to 21.40 per cent in 2013-14, thereafter it increased 
to 22.83 per cent in 2015-16 and is budgeted to be 
around 24.10 per cent in 2017-18 (table 1). RBI’s re-
cent report on State finances attribute UDAY to result 
in an increase in outstanding liabilities as percentage 
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Table 3: States with Fiscal Deficit/Surplus
2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 RE 2017-18 BE
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Total 28 28 28 29 29 28 28
     Note: Data for Manipur for the year 2016-17RE and 2017-18BE not available.
     Source: Finance Accounts of State (various years) and Budget Documents 2017-18.
Note: Surplus (+) / Deficit (-)
Source: Finance Accounts of State (various years) and Budget Documents 2017-18; Economic Survey 2016-17, Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India.
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of GDP by about 1.5 per cent in 2016 over 2015 and by 
0.7 per cent in 2017 over 2016. The report further cau-
tions about the increase in future liabilities of States if 
farm loan waivers become the norm. State-wise anal-
ysis show that between 2014-15 and 2015-16 and be-
tween 2015-16 and 2016-17RE, outstanding liabilities 
as percentage of GSDP increased in 18 and 17 States 
respectively. 
Trends in Central Transfers to States 
While tax devolution as percentage of GSDP2 ag-
gregated across all States increased for all States in 
2015-16, the first year of the award of the Fourteenth 
Finance Commission (FFC) as compared to 2014-15-
the terminal year of the Thirteenth Finance Commis-
sion award, grants (through State budgets) as percent-
age of all State GSDP declined (Fig 3). If we add to it, 
grants that were going directly to State implementing 
agencies bypassing the State budgets, we find total 
grants as a percentage of GSDP have also declined in 
2 GSDP number used in the analysis is at current prices-2011-12 series.
2015-16 (Fig 4). This is not surprising given the re-
structuring of grants to accommodate enhanced tax 
devolution. However, total grants to States are budget-
ed to increase in 2016-17RE.
However, if we compare transfer to GSDP ratio be-
tween 2011-12 and 2017-18BE, it declined sharp-
ly from 6.76 per cent in 2011-12 to 5.74 per cent in 
2014-15 (Fig 5). Post FFC award there is a significant 
increase in transfer to GSDP ratio to 6.36 per cent 
in 2015-16. Total transfers are budgeted to increase 
further to 7.00 per cent in 2016-17RE and 7.03 per 
cent in 2017-18BE. Not only has the total transfers to 
States increased, its composition has also undergone 
a change during this period. Due to the increase in 
devolution to 42 per cent of shareable taxes, untied 
and formula based transfers (i.e., tax devolution) have 
become the dominant form of transfers accounting 
for about 56.8 per cent of total central transfers to 
State governments in 2017-18BE.
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The share of general purpose transfers,3 which are un-
conditional in nature, in total transfers increased from 
51.41 per cent in 2011-12 to 59.74 per cent in 2017-
18BE while that of specific purpose transfers, which 
are conditional in nature, have declined from 48.59 
per cent to 40.26 per cent during this period (fig 6).
State-wise analysis reveal that, while all States bene-
fitted from the increase in tax devolution in 2015-16 
as compared to 2014-15, many of them experienced 
a reduction in central grants during this period. To-
tal central transfers to States (including those going 
outside the State budgets) as percentage of GSDP 
declined for a number of States in 2015-16 vis-à-vis 
2014-15 as evident from fig 7.
Own Tax Revenue of States 
There has been a decline in own revenues aggregated 
across all States as percentage of GSDP between 2011-
3 We have considered tax devolution by Finance Commissions, Normal Central Assistance (or plan grants to State though Gadg-
il-Mukherjee formula) and post-devolution Non-plan Revenue Deficit/Revenue Deficit Grants recommended by Finance Commis-
sions as General Purpose transfers.
12 and 2017-18BE mainly due to the fall in own tax 
revenues as evident from table 4. Own non-tax reve-
nues have largely remained stagnant during this peri-
od. Between 2014-15 and 2015-16 own-tax revenues 
as percentage of GSDP declined in 19 States. States 
showing an increase in own tax revenues during this 
period are - Assam, Bihar, Goa, Haryana, Himachal 
Pradesh, J&K, Odisha, Mizoram, Rajasthan, and Tel-
angana. A total of 14 States show a decline in own tax 
revenues in 2016-17 as compared to 2015-16 while 
the number of States where own tax revenues as per-
centage of GSDP have declined in 2017-18BE over 
2016-17RE are 13.
Analysis of own-tax revenues reveal that the most 
important state tax is the Sales tax/VAT which ac-
count for about 62-64 per cent of own-tax revenues 
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              Source: Finance Accounts (various years) and Budget Documents 2017-18 of State Governments.
            Source: Finance Accounts and Budget documents of States; Ministry of Finance, Government of India
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in aggregate. The other important state taxes are State 
Excise and Stamp and Registration fees. These three 
taxes together account for around 85-86 per cent of 
own-tax revenues aggregated across states (see table 
5). Nine states account for about 69-70 per cent of 
own tax revenues of all states taken together. These 
are Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharash-
tra, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, Uttar Pradesh 
and West Bengal. 
As percentage of all states GSDP, these taxes also show 
a marginal decline between 2011-12 and 2017-18BE. 
State Sales tax/VAT as per cent of GSDP declined from 
4.17 per cent in 2011-12 to 3.94 per cent in 2015-16 
and is budgeted to be around 3.99 per cent in 2017-
18BE, state excise declined from 0.87 per cent to 0.75 
per cent and stamp and registration fee from 0.78 per 
cent to 0.61 per cent during this period.
With the roll out of GST from 1 July, 2017, a number of 
state taxes have been subsumed under GST. These are 
State VAT, central sales tax, purchase tax, luxury tax, 
entry tax (all forms), entertainment tax (not levied by 
local governments), tax on advertisements, taxes on 
lotteries, betting and gambling and state surcharg-
es and cesses so far as they relate to supply of goods 
and services. What will be its impact on the own tax 
revenues of the state governments will depend on the 
revenue buoyancy of the GST. However, for the next 
five years the Union government has guaranteed all 
states governments a compensation equivalent to 14 
per cent annual growth in revenues. 
Expenditures
Expenditures aggregated across all States between 
2014-15 and 2015-16 show total expenditure as per-
centage of all State GSDP to be higher in 2015-16 as 
evident from table 6. While revenue expenditure in-
creased marginally during this period, the increase 
in total expenditures is largely driven by increase in 
capital expenditure which as percentage of GSDP in-
creased from 2.27 per cent in 2014-15 to 2.49 per cent 
in 2015-16. In 2017-18BE, both Revenue and Capital 
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Table 4: Own Revenues of States
                (INR In Crores) 




Own Tax Revenue (OTR) 557396 654550 712417 780007 848035 955477 1098264
Own Non-Tax Revenue (ONTR) 99128 117262 132543 143721 153653 184325 195056
Own Revenue Receipts (ORR) 656523 771811 844960 923728 1001689 1139801 1293320
OTR as % of GSDP 6.74 6.95 6.64 6.51 6.33 6.35 6.44
ONTR as % of GSDP 1.20 1.24 1.24 1.20 1.15 1.23 1.14
ORR as % of GSDP 7.94 8.19 7.88 7.70 7.48 7.58 7.58
         Source: Finance Accounts and Budget documents of States.
Table 5: Composition of Own Tax Revenues of States
             (percent) 




State Sales Tax/VAT 61.91 61.70 63.72 63.33 62.36 63.88 64.37
State Excise 12.88 12.62 11.42 11.70 11.91 11.73 12.04
Stamp & Registration Fees 11.55 11.55 10.85 10.96 10.92 9.76 9.78
Other State Taxes 13.67 14.13 14.01 14.01 14.81 14.63 13.82
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
As % of GSDP
State Sales Tax/VAT 4.17 4.29 4.23 4.05 3.94 4.05 3.99
State Excise 0.87 0.88 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.74 0.75
Stamp & Registration Fees 0.78 0.80 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.62 0.61
Other State Taxes 0.92 0.98 0.93 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.86
             Source: Finance Accounts and Budget documents of States.
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expenditure are budgeted to increase to 14.57 per cent 
and 2.79 per cent of GSDP respectively. Capital ex-
penditure on general services as percentage of GSDP 
has largely remained unchanged between 2014-15 and 
2017-18BE. The entire increase in capital expenditures 
is primarily due to the increase in capital expenditure 
on economic and social services. However, there are 
State-wise variations. The capital expenditure on so-
cial services as percentage of GSDP increased from 
0.53 per cent in 2014-15 to 0.70 per cent in 2017-
18BE while capital expenditure on economic services 
increased by 0.34 percentage points during this peri-
od and was budgeted to be around 1.92 per cent in 
2017-18BE. Total expenditure as percentage of GSDP 
declined in 2015-16 vis-à-vis 2014-15 in 14 States 
while 3 States have budgeted for an increase in total 
expenditures in 2016-17RE over 2015-16. Although 
capital expenditures as percentage of GSDP is higher 
in 2015-16 as compared to 2014-15, 12 States show a 
decline. These are Assam, Gujarat, Karnataka, Mani-
pur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim, 
Tamil Nadu, Tripura and Uttarakhand. In 2016-17RE, 
9 States budgeted for a decline in capital expenditure 
(as per cent of GSDP) over 2015-16.
Between 2014-15 and 2015-16, while total expendi-
ture on general services as percentage of GSDP have 
declined from 4.46 per cent to 4.39 percent, expendi-
tures on social services and economic services have 
increased (table 6). Expenditures on general services 
are budgeted to decline further in 2017-18BE. Be-
tween 2014-15 and 2017-18BE, the share of expendi-
ture on social services in total expenditure is budgeted 
to increase from 36.47 per cent to 37.17 per cent while 
that of expenditure on economic services have largely 
4 Expenditure on ‘Education’ pertains to expenditure on ‘Education, Sports, Arts and Culture, while expenditure on ‘Health’ con-
sists of expenditure on Medical and Public Health.
remain unchanged at around 31.30 percent. 
The expenditure on social services aggregated across 
all States as per cent of all State GSDP show an increase 
between 2014-15 and 2017-18BE. Expenditures on 
education and health,4 which account for about 53-55 
per cent of total social sector expenditures, have not 
shown a major increase when measured as a percent-
age of GSDP. The increase in expenditures in social 
services as percentage of GSDP is largely driven by the 
increase in expenditures in urban development, wa-
ter supply and sanitation, housing, and welfare of SCs, 
STs and backward classes.
State-wise analysis show that between  2014-15 and 
2015-16, expenditure as percentage of GSDP - 
a) on social services declined in 15 States, namely 
Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Chhat-
tisgarh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, 
Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, 
Uttarakhand and West Bengal; 
b) on education declined in 20 States. These are Andhra 
Pradesh, Assam, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Hi-
machal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Naga-
land, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttara-
khand and West Bengal; and 
c) on health declined in 10 States viz., Andhra Pradesh, 
Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, and 
Uttarakhand.
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Table 6: Trends in Expenditure Aggregated Across States















Total Expenditure 15.06 15.12 14.92 15.92 16.21 17.59 17.36
Revenue Expenditure 12.99 13.07 12.86 13.66 13.72 14.81 14.57
Capital Expenditure 2.07 2.05 2.06 2.27 2.49 2.77 2.79
Expenditure on General Services 4.66 4.55 4.46 4.46 4.39 4.08 4.11
Expenditure on Economic Services 4.29 4.40 4.23 4.98 5.11 5.51 5.44
Expenditure on Social Services 5.58 5.63 5.61 5.81 6.04 6.71 6.45
Social Services
Expenditure On Education 2.68 2.67 2.63 2.70 2.68 2.79 2.69
Expenditure on Health 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.73
  Source: Finance Accounts and Budget documents of States
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If we examine the trend in per capita expenditures on 
social sector we find that between 2011-12 and 2015-
16, per capita expenditures of all States, in real terms, 
in education, health and social services increased at an 
annual average rate of 6.39 percent, 10.81 per cent and 
8.28 per cent respectively. The rate of growth of per 
capita expenditures (in real terms) was much lower 
for the North-Eastern and Himalayan (NE&H) States. 
However, the per capital social sector expenditures of 
aggregated across 11 NE&H is on an average higher 
than that of the general category States. Eight States 
were spending less than the all States average per 
capita expenditure on social services and education 
in 2014-15 and 2015-16. As regards expenditure on 
health, 9 States were spending less than all State per 
capita expenditure in 2014-15 and 5 States in 2015-16 
as can be seen from table 7. From the table it is evident 
that States spending lower than all States average per 
capita expenditures in social sector are mostly States 
with lowest per capita GSDP in the country, except 
Punjab which is a high income State and West Bengal 
which is a middle income State. These low per capita 
income States are also the States having some of the 
lowest human development indicators in the country.
In order to examine whether State-level equalisation 
is happening or not with respect to social sector ex-
penditures we compare the ratio of per capita expen-
diture of highest per capita income State and lowest 
per capita expenditure State between 2014-15 and 
5 The 8 States are Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh
6 These States are Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan, Bihar, Jammu & Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil 
Nadu, Himachal Pradesh, Telangana, Madhya Pradesh and Meghalaya.
2015-16 among the general category States and also 
among the NE&H States. Among the general catego-
ry States we find that per capita expenditures on ed-
ucation, health and social services are not converging 
and the gap between the State with the highest and 
lowest per capita expenditure has increased. Howev-
er, among the NE&H States the gap between States 
with the highest and lowest per capital expenditure 
on health and social services have declined in 2015-16 
vis-à-vis 2014-15, but in case of education we find that 
the gap have increased.
Outstanding Liabilities
Outstanding liabilities aggregated across all States as 
percentage of GSDP have declined from 23.60 per 
cent in 2011-12 to 22.31 per cent in 2014-15 and it 
increased by one percentage point to 23.31 per cent in 
the following year. Outstanding liabilities are budget-
ed to further increase to 24.13 per cent in 2016-17RE. 
In 2015-16, 18 States report an increase in outstanding 
liabilities as percentage of GSDP over 2014-15, while 
17 States budget for an increase in 2016-17RE. As per 
information from RBI, during 2015-16 eight States5 
borrowed INR 98960 crores under UDAY while in 
2016-17 thirteen States6 borrowed under UDAY. The 
increase in liabilities of the State governments in 2015-
16 and 2016-17 could be due to UDAY liabilities, as 
these liabilities add to the debt of the States. More-
over, the new framework of borrowing recommended 
by the FFC provided additional borrowing to fiscally 
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Table 7: States spending lower (in per capita terms) than All State Average Expenditure on Social Sector
2014-15 2015-16
Social Services Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, 
Odisha, Punjab, Telangana, Uttar 
Pradesh, West Bengal
(8 States)
Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Mad-
hya Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab, 
Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal
(8 States)
Education Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, 
Odisha, Punjab, Telangana, Uttar 
Pradesh, West Bengal
(8 States)
Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya 
Pradesh, Odisha, Punjab, Telan-
gana, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal
(8 States)
Health Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Jharkhand, 
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Telan-
gana, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal
(9 States)
Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya 




prudent States.7 This facility came into operation in 
2016-17, the second year of the award of the FFC. 
As per estimates by RBI, States eligible for additional 
borrowings are:
i) Additional borrowing of 0.25 per cent of GSDP: 
Arunachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Ma-
nipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura, Uttar 
Pradesh and Uttarakhand (9 States); 
ii) Additional borrowing of 0.50 per cent of GSDP: Ch-
hattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, 
Odisha, Sikkim and Telangana (7 States).
In addition to the liabilities on account of UDAY, the 
increase in outstanding liabilities aggregated across 
states in the fiscal year 2016-17 could be due to the ad-
ditional borrowing limits recommended by the FFC.
7 For more details refer to Chakraborty et al. (2016).
The reduction in outstanding liabilities during 2011-
12 and 2014-15 was accompanied by a decline in in-
terest payments to GSDP ratio. Between 2011-12 and 
2015-16, interest payments aggregated across all States 
as percentage of GSDP declined from 1.65 per cent to 
1.60 percent. However, with the increase in liabilities 
of State governments from 2015-16, interest payment 
as percentage of all State GSDP is budgeted to increase 
to 1.69 per cent in 2016-17RE and further to 1.70 per 
cent in 2017-18BE.
Conclusion
Based on our analysis of State Budgets 2017-18, it is 
observed that all State fiscal deficit has increased in 
recent years. Fiscal deficit to GDP ratio in the year 
2015-16 was 3.03 per cent. In the year 2016-17 (RE) 
and 2017-18 (BE) it is estimated to be 3.67 and 2.69 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. IDRC project on ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in India’.
Fig 8: Change in Outstanding Liabilities of states between 2015-16 & 2014-15 and 2016-17RE & 2015-16 
(as per cent of GSDP)
Note: Does not include Manipur; States with Red bars are the States that have taken over DISCOM debt in 2015-16 and 2016-17. 
State with bold red numbers are eligible to 0.50 per cent additional borrowings in 2016-17 and those with blue red numbers eligible 
for additional 0.25 per cent borrowing based on FFC recommendations. 
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per cent respectively. Without UDAY liabilities, it is 
expected to be 3.32 per cent in 2016-17 (RE). It needs 
to be emphasized that even though the deficit level is 
on the rise, without UDAY liability it remained well 
below the FRBM targets in 2015-16 and states in ag-
gregate is expected to be revert to below 3 per cent 
target of deficit in 2017-18. However, the level of fiscal 
imbalance is asymmetric across States. Some of the 
big States in terms of size of government expendi-
ture have slipped into revenue deficits in recent years, 
which is a cause for concern. Though there has been 
an increase in the level of capital expenditure in States, 
its sustenance would depend on what happens to the 
revenue deficit. Downside fiscal risks are many and 
needs to be tackled in the medium term so that fiscal 
space for development spending is enhanced.   
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1. Introduction
With the introduction of UDAY1 - Ujwal DISCOM 
Assurance Yojana - States’ deficits and debt have in-
creased. We examine the progress of UDAY and its 
impact on sub-national public finances.2 The UDAY 
scheme required State governments to absorb 75% of 
the DISCOM debt - 50% in 2015-16 and 25% in 2016-
17. The scheme also issued bonds to take over DIS-
COM debt with a mix of equity, grant and loan. Since 
its launch, 27 States have signed MoU with the Union 
government and have joined this scheme. 
This paper analyses the State-wise progress of UDAY 
scheme with a focus on financial and operation-
al efficiency parameters. This paper also examines 
the impact of the UDAY scheme on State Finances. 
In 2015-16, eight States (Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Chhattisgarh, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, Bihar, 
Jharkhand and Haryana) borrowed under UDAY, 
while in 2016-17, twelve States (Uttar Pradesh, Maha-
rashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Bihar, Jammu & Kashmir, 
Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Himachal Pradesh, Tel-
angana, Madhya Pradesh and Meghalaya) borrowed 
under UDAY.3  The other eight States (Gujarat, Goa, 
Manipur, Tripura, Uttarakhand, Puducherry and Ker-
ala) have joined UDAY for achieving operational effi-
ciency. 
The impact of UDAY on State finances of each of these 
individual States is difficult to undertake, as in many 
1 The Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana (UDAY) scheme was announced by Minister of State (IC) for Power, Coal & New and 
Renewable Energy in November 2015..
2 The RBI in its State Finance Report-2016-17  has given data for fiscal deficit with and without UDAY for the year 2016-17 (RE) 
at 3.4 per cent (with UDAY) and 2.7 per cent (without UDAY) of GSDP (RBI 2017, page 13) respectively.
3 Obtained from The Economic Survey, Volume 2 submitted in August 2017 and also from RBI State Finance report 2016-17.
States data at sufficient level of disaggregation is not 
available. However, our analysis is based on the UDAY 
Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) signed as 
tripartite agreement between the Government of In-
dia, DISCOMs and the State Governments, and State-
wise information provided in the UDAY portal of 
Government of India.  However, detailed analysis of 
the impact of UDAY on State finances has been car-
ried out for the State of Rajasthan. The paper tries to 
forecast the trajectory of debt and deficits incorpo-
rating the UDAY power debt to understand the fiscal 
implications on State finances of Rajasthan. It needs 
to be noted that the impact of UDAY is asymmetric 
across States and this result cannot be generalized for 
States. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 
3 analyse respectively the financial and operational ef-
ficiency parameters. The aggregate and State-wise pic-
ture of the performance of UDAY scheme on quarter-
ly basis is also presented here. There are four financial 
parameters and ten operational efficiency parameters 
envisaged in UDAY MoUs. Section 4 analyses the im-
pact of UDAY on State finances, with special reference 
to the State of Rajasthan and provides the fiscal fore-
casts of UDAY on debt-deficit dynamics of the State.
2. Financial Performance of States under UDAY 
The objective of UDAY is to improve operational ef-
ficiency and financial transformation of electricity 
distribution companies (DISCOMs). Also the scheme 
objective includes reduction in the cost of genera-













tion of power and energy conservation. This section 
analyses the UDAY financial performance parameters 
across States of India. The financial parameters ana-
lysed in this section are the progress in the issuance 
of UDAY bonds, the reduction in aggregate technical 
and commercial losses, the reduction in the gap be-
tween average cost of supply (ACS) per unit of power 
and per unit average revenue realised (ARR) and tariff 
revisions by DISCOMs post UDAY. 
2.1 State-wise Issuance of UDAY Bonds  
As mentioned, under the UDAY scheme, States agreed 
to convert 75% of the DISCOM debt into State gov-
ernment non-SLR bonds. These UDAY bonds were 
priced at not more than 75 basis points above the pre-
vailing cut-off yield rate of government security of 10-
year maturity. In aggregate level, so far, around 86% of 
UDAY bonds were issued (INR 2.32 lakh crores out 
of INR 2.69 Lakh crores) across all UDAY States. Five 
States, namely Jammu & Kashmir, Bihar, Chhattis-
garh, Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand issued 100% of 
the bonds to the DISCOMs as mandated in the UDAY 
scheme. Seven States (Maharashtra, Telangana, Him-
achal Pradesh, Haryana, Meghalaya, Tamil Nadu and 
Punjab) issued 75% of the total bonds so far. For eight 
States, namely, Gujarat, Karnataka, Puducherry, Tri-
pura, Assam, Uttarakhand, Goa, Manipur and Ker-
ala no information on the issuance of bond is avail-
able. As per the MoUs, there were no debt takeover 
in most of these States. These States are Gujarat, Goa, 
Manipur, Tripura, Uttarakhand and Puducherry and 
Kerala.  As mentioned, in these States, this scheme is 
targeted only to achieve further operational efficiency 
of DISCOMs. 
2.2 State-wise aggregate technical and commercial 
losses (AT&C)
The aggregate technical and commercial losses is 
termed as AT&C loss. This includes losses which are 
technical and commercial. The commercial losses also 
include the loss of electricity due to theft, illegal me-
tering etc. The technical losses are unavoidable losses 
in the transmission system. As per the UDAY scheme, 
State governments are required to reduce these losses 
to 15% by 2018-19.
As shown in Figure 2, only six States (Himachal 
Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Telangana, Ut-
tarakhand and Tamil Nadu) have AT&C losses below 
the 15 % norm. The all States combined average is at 
19.93%.  Jammu & Kashmir reports AT&C loss of 
61.34 % which is the highest while Himachal Pradesh 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. IDRC project on ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in India’.
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    Figure 1: State-wise Issuance of UDAY Bonds (%)
Source : (Basic data), Government of India , UDAY portal 
has reported  4.15% AT&C loss which is the lowest in 
the scale. Six States report AT &C losses in the range of 
20-30%. These States are Assam, Haryana, U.P, Mad-
hya Pradesh, Jharkhand and Rajasthan. The highest in 
the scale are Jammu & Kashmir, Meghalaya, Manipur 
and Bihar that have AT&C losses between 30-60%.
2.3 State-wise Commercial Viability: ACS-ARR 
Gap (INR per unit)
Another milestone to be achieved under UDAY is 
reduction in the difference between average cost of 
Supply (ACS) per unit of power and per unit average 
revenue realised (ARR) to nil by 2018-19. This tests 
the commercial viability by covering the cost through 
revenues. The overall gap in India is INR 0.45 per 
unit.4 
Eighteen out of the 24 States that reported the data 
have the gap ratio between 0-1. The gap is below 0.5 
4 UDAY portal reports that this data does not include data of Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram.
5 Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission. 2017. “Terms  and Conditions for Determination of Tariff, Regulations 2017”
for Karnataka, Puducherry, Maharashtra, Tripura, 
Haryana, Uttarakhand, Manipur and Tamil Nadu. Ten 
States report gap ratio of above 0.5 but below 1. These 
are Goa, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Kerala, 
Bihar, U.P., Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Assam. 
Jammu & Kashmir tops the list of having a ratio of 
2.15 followed by Meghalaya (1.81) and Jharkhand 
(1.48). Only Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh and Chhat-
tisgarh have reported negative ratios for the same.  For 
the FY 2016-17, out of 27 States tariff orders were is-
sued by 24 States.5 
3. Operational Efficiency Parameters under UDAY 
Apart from financial parameters to check perfor-
mance of DISCOM across States, there are stipulated 
10 operational efficiency indicators to be monitored 
under UDAY scheme. This section analyses these 10 
operational efficiency indicators to understand the 
progress of UDAY across States.  
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Figure 2: State-wise  AT&C Loss (Aggregate Technical and Commercial Loss)
Source: (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal 
3.1 Power Supply Infrastructure (Feeder Metering) 
Feeder metering is to ensure effective power supply 
and reduction in Aggregate Technical and Commer-
cial (AT&C) losses. Target for 100% metering is the 
stated goal under UDAY. Figures 4 and 5 depict the 
progress made by the distribution companies in this 
respect. Also, it projects the outcome in absolute terms 
on the basis of the target set by the States at the time 
of joining UDAY. Figure 4 gives the State-wise feed-
er metering for urban areas of the States. Out of 24 
States, 21 States have achieved their targets while Gu-
jarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, H.P, Andhra Pradesh 
are much ahead of their set targets. For urban feeders, 
Assam, Meghalaya and Kerala are yet to achieve their 
targets. The State-wise UDAY health cards of respec-
tive States report that even though States have not 
achieved their targets, still there is large improvement 
compared to pre –UDAY scenario. Feeder metering 
for both urban and rural shows an upward trend.
If we consider Feeder Metering in rural areas, 21 States 
have provided data, wherein fourteen States have re-
ported to have achieved the targets. Meghalaya, Ker-
ala, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, U.P. and Assam 
have not been able to achieve the targets in rural areas. 
Himachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Telungana have 
not reported the progress and set targets.
3.2 Energy Distribution Infrastructure: DT Meter-
ing 
The Distribution Transformer Metering (DTM) helps 
in improving the energy distribution system and re-
duces the losses caused by thefts. This helps in load 
balancing and monitoring the quality of power. Also, 
it provides real time input and output data of the units 
consumed for better records. Figures 6 and 7 provide 
the DT metering for urban and rural areas respective-
ly in absolute term. Out of 22 State utilities that report 
ed data depict that this target has not been achieved 
by 18 States. Gujarat, Assam and Jharkhand lead in 
reaching their targets while all the other States lag be-
hind. On the other hand, DT Metering in the rural 
areas seems to be a major challenge as no States out 
of 24 have been able to achieve this target by this year.
3.4  Electricity Access to Un-connected Households
Figure 8 provides the progress of the States on the ba-
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. IDRC project on ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in India’.
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Figure 3: ACS-ARR Gap (INR/Unit) 
 Source : (Basic data), Government of India , UDAY portal
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Figure 4: Power Infrastructure: State-wise Feeder Metering (Urban)
 Source : (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal
Figure 5: Power Infrastructure - State-wise Feeder Metering (Rural)
 Source: (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal 
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Figure 6: DT Metering (Urban)
Source : (Basic data), Government of India , UDAY portal 
Figure  7: State-wise DT Metering (Rural)
Source: (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal 
sis of their targets for the financial year, in absolute 
terms, for electricity access to unconnected house-
holds. We do not have data for Tamil Nadu, Sikkim, 
Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. Electricity access 
is low on average for all the States except Gujarat, 
Puducherry, Punjab and Goa that have achieved their 
targets for the year (Figure 8). Even though the States 
have not been able to achieve their targets, a pre and 
post UDAY analysis shows improvement in electricity 
access to households vis-à-vis prior to UDAY.
3.5 Smart Metering above 200 and upto 500 Kwh & 
above 500 Kwh
Installations of Smart Meters help in recording energy 
consumption in intervals of an hour or less and com-
municate the same to State utilities for effective mon-
itoring and billing.6 The government aims to reach 
this target by December 2017 for greater than 500 
units and December 2019 for greater than 200 units. 
Out of the 27 States that have signed MoU, Punjab, 
6  Ministry of Power, Coal and New & Renewable Energy, 2015. “Presentation on Towards Ujwal Bharat UDAY: The Story of Re-
forms”, (November). 
Puducherry, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram 
have not reported the data on same. Also, none of the 
24 States that have reported seem to reach near the 
target for above 500 kWH (figure 9) as well as above 
200 and upto 500 Kwh (figure 9 and 10). 
Only six States have reported data on pre and post 
UDAY progress and witness an improvement in their 
goals after UDAY for above 200 units. This progress 
is based on the quarterly performance of the States. 
These States are Meghalaya, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar 
Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Tripura and Karnataka. 
3.6 Feeder Segregation
As per the RBI State Finance report 2016, those States 
who adopt UDAY and perform as per operational 
milestones will be given additional / priority funding 
through Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana 
(DDUGJY), Integrated Power Development Scheme 
(IPDS), Power Sector Development Fund (PSDF) or 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. IDRC project on ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in India’.
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Figure 8: State-wise Electricity Access to Unconnected Households
                               Source: (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal
other such schemes of Ministry of Power and Minis 
try of New and Renewable Energy.7 
Government approved Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram 
Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) that aims at segregation of 
agricultural and non-agricultural feeders for unin-
terrupted supply to non-agricultural consumers in 
the rural areas.8 This aims at imparting 24*7 electric-
ity supply to the rural households. Figure 11 gives us 
the State-wise Feeder segregation targets achieved 
(in per cent) so far.  This includes the data reported 
for 17 States wherein only Gujarat and Haryana have 
achieved the targets. A pre and post UDAY trend for 
feeder segregation shows progress after signing for 
7 States not meeting operational milestones, however, will be liable to forfeiture of their claim on IPDS and DDUGJY grants. (Box 
IV.1 of RBI State Finance Report, April 2016). https://rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=16836
8 Ministry of Power. 06-August-2015. “Feeder Segregation Scheme”. Press Information Bureau, Government of India.
UDAY for 7 States out of 24 States. The remaining 
States have not reported yet. 
3.7 Rural Feeder Audit
Rural feeder audit helps in identifying the utilities/
feeders making losses and helps in taking necessary 
actions to improve their health. Also, the audit locates 
the areas that require immediate attention thereby im-
proving efficiency. 
Figure 12 provides the State-wise data for rural–feed-
er audit. Gujarat, Maharashtra, H.P., Madhya Pradesh, 
Goa, Manipur and Rajasthan have successfully
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. IDRC project on ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in India’.
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Figure 9: State-wise Smart Metering Above 500kWH
Source: (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal 
Figure 10: State-wise Smart Metering 
above 200 kWH up to 500kW
Source : (Basic data), Government of India , UDAY portal 
reached their targets for energy audit. Moreover, out 
of 24 States, 17 States are yet to attain their objectives. 
The pre and post UDAY performance of 14 States (out 
of 24) show a positive trend and progress in their tar-
gets. 
3.8 Distribution of LEDs under UJALA 
UJALA, an acronym for Unnat Jyoti by Affordable 
LEDs for All, is being implemented by Energy Efficien-
cy Services Limited (EESL). Under this scheme, supe-
rior quality energy efficient LED bulbs are distributed 
to domestic consumers at INR 75 to 95, which is 80% 
less than the market price of INR 350-450. The main 
idea is promoting energy conservation and creating 
awareness about energy saving technologies.9 Table 13 
depicts State-wise distribution of LEDs under UJA-
LA scheme. Out of the 24 States, Gujarat, Karnataka, 
Maharashtra, Puducherry, Tripura, Andhra Pradesh, 
Assam, U.P., Bihar, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have 
achieved their target levels while other States report 
less than the total no. of LEDs targeted. The pre and 
post UDAY trend depicts progress for all the States 
from 2016 to June, 2017. 
9 Fact Sheet on Unnat Jyoti by Affordable LEDs for All (UJALA) PIB, Government of India.
Taking India as a whole, the aggregate picture is de-
picted in Figure 14. As evident, aggregate operation-
al parameters for India show an upward trend in the 
performance if we compare pre and post UDAY. All 
the parameters are analysed from March 2016 to Sep-
tember 2017 (figure 14 ). 
On the basis of operational and financial parameters, 
State-wise performance has been discussed. Gujarat
takes the lead as the best performer among all the 
States. It tops for having the lowest ATC losses and 
the ACS/ARR gap is also negative. It is followed by 
Karnataka, Maharashtra, Puducherry, Telangana and 
Himachal Pradesh. States that are at the bottom in 
terms of performance of these indicators are Tamil 
Nadu, J&K, Meghalaya, Kerala and Rajasthan. In ad-
dition to this, ranking of States have also been done 
on quarterly basis for the DISCOMs. Among the DIS-
COMs, Bangalore Electricity Supply Company Ltd. 
(BESCOM) tops the scale based on the performance 
of parameters on quarterly basis. This is followed by 3 
out of 4 DISCOMs of Gujarat.
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. IDRC project on ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in India’.
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Figure 11: State-wise Feeder Segregation
Source : (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal 
 
4. Impact of UDAY on State Public Finance 
It is pertinent to ask about the likely impact and fu-
ture implications of the UDAY debt on State financ-
es. To arrive at an aggregate debt (with and without 
UDAY) is a challenge. As all States have not provided 
UDAY-disaggregated debt figures in their recent bud-
gets, we cannot provide an aggregate number. 
The RBI State Finances Study for the year 2016-17 
has also provided the fiscal deficit number. However, 
in all likelihood, there will be asymmetric impact of 
UDAY across States since power sector debt liabilities 
are different across States. For instance, the Budget 
2017-18 of Rajasthan revealed that the fiscal deficit 
with UDAY as percent of GSDP was as high as 9.38 
per cent in 2015-16 due to the absorption of 50 per-
cent of DISCOM debt in that year (which was INR 
62,000 crores). 
The outstanding liabilities of Rajasthan increased to 
33.79 per cent in 2016-17 (RE) which was much above 
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi. IDRC project on ‘Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers in India’.
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Figure 12: State-wise Rural Feeder Audit
Source: (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal 
Figure 13: State-wise Distribution of LEDs under 
UJALA
Source: (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal 
the FC-XIV suggested debt cap of 25 per cent of GSDP 
or the proposed target of 20 per cent recommended 
by FRBM review committee to be achieved by 2025.
The Economic Survey – Volume 2 submitted in ear-
ly August 2017 observed that: The Union Budget for 
2017-18 opted for a gradual rather than the sharp con-
solidation path recommended by the FRBM Review 
Committee, prudently balancing the requirements of 
a cyclically weakening economy and the imperative of 
maintaining credibility, especially in the wake of dis-
ruptions to State government finances, reflecting their 
absorption of the DISCOM liabilities under the UDAY 
programme.
The RBI Study on State Finances points to the wors-
ening of the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio on account of 
the increase in capital outlay and loans and advanc-
es to power projects-around $98960 crore was bor-
rowed under UDAY by eight States during 2015-16 
(Economic Survey, Volume 2, 2017). Net of UDAY 
bonds, consolidated State fiscal deficit moderates by 
Figure 14: Progress of UDAY Operational Parameters (as of March 31, 2017)
                           Source: (Basic data), Government of India, UDAY portal 
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Figure 15: Fiscal deficit of the States - with and without UDAY 
Source: (Basic data), RBI State Finances & Economic Survey, Vol 2, 2017.
Figure 16: Forecast of Revenue Deficit (with and without UDAY in Rajasthan)
Source: Chakraborty et al., 2017
Figure 18: Forecast of Outstanding Liabilities with and without UDAY in Rajasthan
Source: Chakraborty, et al. 2017
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Figure  17: Forecast of Fiscal Deficit: with and without UDAY in Rajasthan
Source: Chakraborty, et al. 2017
0.7 percentage point to 2.9 per cent (Figure 12). Thus 
with UDAY, as per the available information, the com-
binedfiscal deficit of States crossed the FRBM bench-
mark of 3.0 per cent. Based on information on 25 
States, the combined fiscal deficit of States in 2016-17 
(RE) would be 3.4 per cent, while it would be 2.7 per 
cent without the UDAY liabilities (Figure 15).
  
The UDAY-incorporated forecast path of outstanding 
liabilities of States would depend on a host of factors 
including the buoyancy of State revenues and perfor-
mance of DISCOMs. As data is not disaggregated for 
UDAY and non-UDAY in all States, we are unable to 
provide all the State-specific forecasts. However, we 
have the forecast path of debt and deficit of Rajasthan-
with and without UDAY. 
4.1 Forecast of Debt-Deficit in Rajasthan (with and 
without UDAY) 
The forecasts of revenue deficit, fiscal deficit and out-
standing liabilities of Rajasthan are shown in Figure 
16, 17 and 18 respectively. The projections are carried 
out on the basis of tax buoyancy, expenditure elastic-
ities and assumed the inflation-growth paths (for de-
tails, Chakraborty et al., 2017). 
5.  Conclusion 
UDAY power debt raises a fundamental question. 
What should be the criteria to judge fiscal prudence 
at the State level? May be it is time to propose that 
future reforms on debt and deficit should judge fiscal 
prudence based on comparable measures of deficits 
and debt across States. The aim should be to have a 
comprehensive measure of Public Sector Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR) by encompassing all public sec-
tor liabilities at the State level including power sector 
debt, than using a measure which only reflects deficit 
arising out of budgetary transactions.
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Rajasthan is the largest State in India (in terms of 
area) with a geographical area of 342.24 thousand sq 
km which constitutes 10.41 per cent of the total geo-
graphical area of the country. It also accounts for 5.66 
per cent of the total population of the country. Rajas-
than is one of the low per capita income States. Per 
capita income as per the latest GSDP data (new series 
- 2011-12) for the year 2014-15 is INR 84837.30. De-
spite low per capita income, the State has made signif-
icant progress in social sector development and also 
reduced level of poverty in recent decades. The State 
also managed its fiscal deficit well. But power sector 
finances continued to be a significant drag on its fis-
cal resources. We analyse the aggregate picture of the 
finances of Rajasthan taking power sector into con-
sideration. 
Importance of Consolidated View of State Finances
Fiscal prudence in most countries, including India, is 
focused on general government deficit. Though, there 
is a strong merit in targeting total public sector bor-
rowing requirements, paucity of data and its timeliness 
always prevented having a consolidated view of public 
sector borrowing. In the multilevel federal system of 
India also, the focus has always been in controlling fis-
cal deficit reflected in the State and union government 
budgets. In case of Rajasthan also, when we consider 
only government deficit, it remained well within the 
Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) target of 3 per cent 
of GSDP in recent years. But the story changed dra-
matically with the introduction of Ujwal DISCOM 
Assurance Yojana (UDAY). Under this scheme, 21 
State governments including Rajasthan have taken 
over 75 per cent of the outstanding debt of the power 
sector-DISCOM companies in the year 2015-16 and 
2016-17. With this, by the end of the fiscal year 2016-
17, aggregate fiscal deficit of Rajasthan, shows an in-
crease from 3.13 per cent of GSDP in 2014-15 to 9.38 
per cent in 2015-16. It is expected to be 5.76 per cent 
in 2016-17 (RE). However, in 2017-18 (BE) fiscal defi-
cit is expected to be 2.99 per cent of GSDP. 
This restructuring of power sector debt has the fol-
lowing long run fiscal implications: 
(a) An increase in deficits, particularly revenue deficit 
due to the increase in interest payment as a result of 
the increase in the stock of outstanding debt. A cor-
responding reduction in capital expenditure is inevi-
table if the State has to remain within the fiscal deficit 
target specified under the Fiscal Responsibility Act.
(b) As UDAY scheme has come into force post Four-
teenth Finance Commission’s  (FFC’s) recommen-
dations, the fiscal framework for higher borrowing 
proposed by FFC for higher capital spending remains 
unclear for all the States participating in UDAY 
scheme.
(c) The FRBM framework proposed by the FRBM 
Review Committee suggests that aggregate State debt 
should be 20 per cent of GDP by 2023. What would 
that mean for States like Rajasthan needs clarity when 
the debt to GSDP ratio with power sector debt now is 
hovering around 34 per cent of GSDP and is likely to 
continue upto 2026-27.   
Overview of State Finances
An overview of State Finances is presented in Table 1. 
As evident from the table, aggregate revenue receipts 
as a percent of GSDP has increased from 13.06 per 












cent to 15.73 percent between 2011-12 and 2017-18 
BE. This increase is due to the increase in own tax to 
GSDP ratio and a notional increase in grants due to 
the changes in accounting of the flow of grants.1  For 
the period from 2014-15 to 2017-18 BE, the increase 
in revenue to GSDP ratio is from 14.91 to 15.73 per 
cent. During the same period, total expenditure as per 
cent of GSDP is expected to increase from 15.59 to 
17.36 per cent.  
Table 2: Revenue Receipts















A Total Revenue Receipt 
(B+C)
13.06 13.55 13.55 15.06 14.91 15.53 15.73
B Own Revenue Receipt 7.92 8.63 8.56 8.56 7.97 7.93 8.34
Own Tax Revenue 5.81 6.17 6.09 6.38 6.35 6.27 6.59
Own Non-Tax Revenue 2.10 2.46 2.47 2.18 1.62 1.66 1.75
C Central Transfers 5.15 4.91 4.99 6.50 6.93 7.60 7.38
Tax Devolution 3.43 3.46 3.40 3.27 4.15 4.48 4.50
Grants-in-aid 1.71 1.45 1.59 3.23 2.78 3.12 2.88
D Grants outside State budget 1.61 1.60 1.56 0.09 -- -- --
All Grants 3.33 3.05 3.15 3.33 2.78 3.12 2.88
E All Central Transfers 
(C+D)
6.76 6.51 6.55 6.59 6.93 7.60 7.38
Source: Finance Accounts and 2017-18 Budget Documents of Government of Rajasthan.
Analysis of finances of the State of Rajasthan reveals 
that own revenues of the State as percentage of GSDP 
has been growing during the period 2011-12 to 2014-
15. Own revenues as percentage of GSDP increased 
1 Grants for various centrally sponsored schemes earlier bypassed State budgets were routed through the State budgets from 2014-
15 onwards (See Table 2). This resulted in an increase in the flow of grants to States in an accounting sense. 
from 7.92 percent in 2011-12 to 8.56 percent in 2014-
15. However, in 2015-16 own revenues declined to 
7.97 percent mainly due to the fall in own non-tax 
revenues which declined from 2.18 percent of GSDP 
in 2014-15 to 1.62 percent in 2015-16. The fall in own 
non-tax revenues was due to the reduction in petro-
leum royalties, receipts under police and miscella-
neous general services. Own tax revenues also fell 
during this period, but the decline was marginal. Own 
Revenues (as percentage of GSDP) are expected to be 
around 7.93 percent in 2016-17 RE and 8.34 percent 
in 2017-18 BE as evident from table 2.
Following the recommendations of the FFC, there 
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Table 1: An Overview of State Finances of Rajasthan (2011-12-to 2017-18)
            (% of GSDP)
2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 RE 2017-18 BE
Revenue Receipts 13.06 13.55 13.55 15.06 14.91 15.53 15.73
Revenue Expenditure 12.29 12.85 13.74 15.59 15.79 17.91 17.36
Capital Expenditure 1.63 2.16 2.49 2.66 3.27 2.47 3.09
Total Expenditure 13.92 15.01 16.22 18.24 19.06 20.38 20.45
Social Services 5.48 5.69 6.56 7.19 7.34 7.86 7.56
Economic Services 4.05 5.06 5.31 6.37 7.05 7.11 7.47
Revenue Deficit 0.77 0.70 -0.19 -0.53 -0.89 -2.38 -1.63
Fiscal Deficit -0.83 -1.73 -2.76 -3.13 -9.38 -6.36 -2.99
Primary Deficit 0.98 -0.04 -1.11 -1.41 -7.59 -3.99 -0.62
Outstanding Liabilities 24.41 23.85 23.63 24.34 31.13 33.79 33.61
Source: Finance Accounts and 2017-18 Budget Documents of Government of Rajasthan.
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was an increase in tax devolution to States. The cri-
teria and weights used by FFC in arriving at the inter 
se share to States resulted in a decline in Rajasthan’s 
share by about 0.358 percentage as compared to the 
inter se share recommended by the Thirteenth Fi-
nance Commission (TFC).2 Despite this, tax devolu-
tion to Rajasthan as percentage of its GSDP increased 
from 3.27 percent in 2014-15 to 4.15 percent in 2015-
16 and is budgeted to further increase to 4.48 percent 
in 2016-17RE and 4.50 percent in 2017-18BE (table 
2). However, between 2014-15 and 2015-16 central 
grants as percentage of GSDP declined from 3.23 per-
cent to 2.78. This is due to the fact that grants were 
restructured based on the recommendations of the 
Committee of Chief Ministers post FFC. 
Prior to 2014-15, a sizeable proportion of central 
grants to States were directly going to implementing 
agencies in the State, outside the State budgets. Be-
tween 2011-12 and 2013-15 they accounted for more 
than 1.50 percent of Rajasthan’s GSDP. However, since 
2014-15, these grants are routed through State bud-
gets. The increase in central grants in 2014-15 (as per-
centage of GSDP) vis-à-vis 2013-14 is largely due to 
the change in the way in which central grants are rout-
ed to States. Total central transfers (including those 
going to implementing agencies) to Rajasthan as per-
centage of GSDP have increased from 6.59 percent in 
2014-15 to 6.93 percent in 2015-16 and further to 7.60 
percent in 2016-17RE and is budgeted to be around 
7.38 percent in 2017-18BE as can be seen from table 2.
2 Rajasthan’s inter se share declined from 5.853 percent under TFC to 5.495 percent under FFC.
3 In January 2016, Rajasthan joined the UDAY scheme. The outstanding debt of the DISCOMs in Rajasthan as on 30.09.2015 was 
INR 80500 crore, out of which 75 per cent, i.e., INR 60500 crore would be taken over by the State, as envisaged in the scheme.
On the expenditure front we find that both revenue 
and capital expenditures as percentage of GSDP have 
increased between 2011-12 and 2015-16 (see table 
3). In 2016-17RE capital expenditure as percentage 
of GSDP at 2.47 percent is lower as compared to that 
in 2015-16. Total expenditure as percentage of GSDP 
increase from 13.92 percent in 2011-12 to 19.06 per-
cent in 2015-16 and is budgeted to increase to 20.45 
percent in 2017-18BE. Expenditures on social services 
and economic services (as percentage of GSDP) also 
show an increasing trend during this period.
There has been a decline in interest payments (as 
percentage of GSDP) between 2011-12 and 2013-14. 
However, from 2014-15 onwards interest payments 
have been increasing. The sharp increase in interest 
payment in 2016-17RE is due to the servicing cost of 
DISCOM loans taken over by the State government 
under the UDAY scheme.3 The interest burden due 
to UDAY would be around 1.20 percent of GSDP in 
2016-17RE and 1.45 percent in 2017-18BE.
From the examination of key deficit indicators of the 
State we see that surplus on the revenue account in 
2011-12 and 2012-13 turned into deficit and we have 
re-emergence of deficit in the revenue account from 
2013-14 as is evident from table 4. The revenue ac-
count has been in deficit since then. In 2016-17RE, 
there was a sharp increase in the revenue deficit. Rev-
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                                              Table 3: Trends in Expenditures 















Revenue Expenditure 12.29 12.85 13.74 15.59 15.79 17.91 17.36
Capital Expenditure 1.63 2.16 2.49 2.66 3.27 2.47 3.09
Total Expenditure, of 
which
13.92 15.01 16.22 18.24 19.06 20.38 20.45
Economic Services 4.05 5.06 5.31 6.37 7.05 7.11 7.47
Social Services 5.48 5.69 6.56 7.19 7.34 7.86 7.56
Education 2.67 2.65 2.80 3.20 3.16 3.43 3.35
Medical & Public Health 0.60 0.63 0.69 0.73 0.79 0.84 0.89
Interest Payment 1.81 1.69 1.65 1.73 1.79 2.37 2.37
of which due to UDAY 0.00 1.20 1.45
Source: Finance Accounts and 2017-18 Budget Documents of Government of Rajasthan.
3
enue Deficit as percentage of GSDP increased from 
0.89 percent in 2015-16 to 2.38 percent in 2016-17RE 
and in 2017-18BE it is budgeted to be around 1.63 
percent. The sharp increase in RD in 2016-17RE was 
due to the increase in interest payment burden on ac-
count of joining the UDAY scheme. In the absence of 
UDAY, the revenue deficit would be around 1.18 per-
cent in 2016-17RE and 0.18 percent in 2017-18BE.
As regards fiscal deficit (FD), we find that FD as per-
centage of GSDP in Rajasthan was well below 3 per-
cent during 2011-12 and 2012-13-14. In 2014-15, the 
FD at 3.13 percent was marginally above the 3 per-
cent mark. However, in 2015-16 the FD increased by 
more than 6.25 percentage points and was about 9.38 
percent of GSDP. This sudden increase was due to 
the takeover of 50 percent of the DISCOMs debt (as 
on 30.09.2015) by the State. In 2016-17, the State is 
expected to take over another 25 percent of the DIS-
COM debt. As a result the FD in 2016-17RE would 
be around 6.36 percent of GSDP. However, in 2017-
18BE, the FD was budgeted to be about 2.99 percent 
of GSDP. In the absence of UDAY scheme the FD of 
Rajasthan as percentage of GSDP would be 3.42 per-
cent and 3.37 percent in 2015-16 and 2016-17RE re-
spectively.
As a result of this takeover of DISCOM debt, the total 
outstanding liabilities of the State government as per-
centage of GSDP which were well below 25 percent 
during 2011-12 and 2014-15 increased to 31.13 per-
cent in 2015-16 and further to 33.79 percent in 2016-
17RE. In 2017-18BE they were budgeted to be around 
33.61 percent (table 4).
Power Sector Finances and Consolidated Fiscal Po-
sition 
So far, as the power sector of Rajasthan is concerned, 
the State government set up the State Electricity Regu-
latory on 2nd January, 2000 and it has been operation-
al since then.  Rajasthan State Electricity Board has 
been unbundled into 5 companies namely (1) Rajas-
than Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (2) Rajasthan 
Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. (3) Jaipur Vidyut 
Vitaran Nigam Ltd. (4) Jodhpur Vidyut Vitaran 
Nigam Ltd. And (5) Ajmer Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd. 
In the year 2011-12, the State purchased 52 per cent 
of power requirement and produced the rest 48 per 
cent in the State. A large proportion of power comes 
from Thermal Coal Fired power plants (51 per cent) 
followed by Hydro power (15 per cent), Gas (6 per 
cent) and  Nuclear (5 per cent) & Others account for 
23 per cent in 2011-12 of the total installed capacity. 
The T&D losses of the most of the power DISCOMs 
although have declined it remained around 23 to 27 
per cent in 2011-12. The total loss of the power util-
ities has gone up substantially from 1347.05 crore in 
2008-09 to 19751.1 crore in 2011-12.
The UDAY scheme
Over the years, Power Distribution Companies (DIS-
COMs) have accumulated the loss of 3.8 lakh crores 
and outstanding debt of 4.3 lakh crores as on March 
2015 (Press Information Bureau, 2015). The increase 
in the debt has been mainly because of non-revision of 
tariff commensurate with the increase in cost of sup-
ply. Moreover, inadequate subsidy receipt and non-im-
provement of efficiency level are also held responsible 
for the enormous increase in power debt. In spite of 
having surplus of power generation, DISCOMs are 
not able to provide electricity to the customers due to 
their debt liabilities. Against this backdrop, the Gov-
ernment of India launched Ujwal DISCOM Assur-
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Table 4: Debt and Deficits















Revenue Deficit 0.77 0.70 -0.19 -0.53 -0.89 -2.38 -1.63
RD (without UDAY) -0.89 -1.18 -0.18
Fiscal Deficit -0.83 -1.73 -2.76 -3.13 -9.38 -6.36 -2.99
FD (without UDAY) -3.42 -3.37 -2.99
Outstanding Liabil-
ities
24.41 23.85 23.63 24.34 31.13 33.79 33.61
     Note: Deficit (-) / Surplus (+)
     Source: Finance Accounts and 2017-18 Budget Documents of Government of Rajasthan.
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ance Yojana (UDAY) (approved by the Union Cabinet 
on 5th November, 2015), which aims at the financial 
turnaround and revival of DISCOMs.4 It is a tripartite 
agreement between Ministry of Power, State govern-
ment and DISCOMs. It is optional for all States; how-
ever, States are encouraged to be a part of the scheme 
and benefit from the same. 
UDAY seeks to set free DISCOMs of their debt in the 
next 2-3 years through the following four initiatives: 
(i) improving operational efficiencies of DISCOMs; 
(ii) reduction of cost of power; (iii) reduction in in-
terest cost of DISCOMs; and (iv) enforcing financial 
discipline on DISCOMs through alignment with State 
finances.5 It is argued that UDAY will be panacea for 
the DISCOM debts of the States. However, it has di-
rect fiscal implications on State finances as States are 
4 The earliest attempt by the central government to support DISCOMs after unbundling of erstwhile State Electricity Board (SEB) 
was in the form of Financial Restructuring Scheme (FRS), 2012. The scheme provided incentive by reimbursing 25 per cent of the 
loans taken over by the States and by providing grant for reduction of aggregate technical and commercial loss (ICRA, 2015). How-
ever, these measures did not provide the intended results as the outstanding debt continued to soar up.
5 Measures of operational efficiency improvements include compulsory smart metering, upgradation of transformers, meters, etc., 
energy efficient measures like LED bulbs, agricultural pumps, fans and air-conditioners. These improvements are likely to bring 
down the gap between average revenue realized (ARR) and average cost of supply (ACS) from 22 per cent to 15 per cent by 2018-
19. Increased supply of cheaper domestic coal, coal linkage rationalization, liberal coal swaps from inefficient to efficient plants, 
coal price rationalization based on gross calorific value (GCV), supply of washed and crushed coal, and faster completion of trans-
mission lines are some of the ways to reduce cost of power.
expected to take over the DISCOM debts. If these 
impacts are large, the States might squeeze the other 
developmental expenditure given the Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act (FRA) target of deficits. 
Debt restructuring mechanism of the UDAY scheme
Under this scheme, States are expected to take over 
75 per cent of DISCOMs debts as on 30th September, 
2015 over two years - 50 per cent in 2015-16 and 25 
per cent in 2016-17 (Press Information Bureau, 2015). 
This will reduce the interest taken over by States to 
around 8-9 per cent from 14-15 per cent. States will 
issue non-SLR State Development Loan (SDL) bonds 
in the market or directly to the respective banks/FIs 
holding the DISCOM debt (maturity period of these 
bonds will be 10-15 years). DISCOM debt not taken 
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Table 5: Selected 17 States - Date of Joining the UDAY


















Source: MoU of the respective States.
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by the States will be converted into loans or bonds 
with interest rate not more than the bank’s base rate 
plus 0.1 per cent by banks/FIs. Moreover, States are 
expected to take over the future losses in a graded 
manner.6
Table 6 demonstrates the amount of DISCOM debt, 
which has to be covered by the States. The data on 
debt is extracted from the respective tripartite agree-
ment, i.e., the MOU signed by the respective states. 
Rajasthan: State-Specific Mechanism and Targets of 
UDAY
The Government of Rajasthan has signed MoU under 
the scheme UDAY (Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yoja-
na) with the Government of India and the DISCOMs 
of the State on January 2016 to ensure financial and 
operational turnaround of the DISCOMs. The DIS-
6 States accepting UDAY and complying with the operational guidelines will be given additional/priority funding through Deen-
dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY),Integrated Power Development Scheme (IPDS), Power Sector Development Fund 
(PSDF) or other such schemes of Ministry of Power and Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. So far 17 States/UTs (Andhra 
Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu & Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Manipur, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Puducherry) have signed the MoU and the States of Telangana, As-
sam and Kerala have given ‘in principle’ approval. Table 5 shows the list of States and the date of signing the MoU.
7 To ensure electrification of 396 villages and 30 lakh households in Rajasthan that are still without electricity. 
8 http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=135834
COMs signed include Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam 
Limited, Jodhpur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and 
Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited. The MOU stat-
ed that this agreement aims at the rapid electrification 
of villages7 and distribution at reduced per unit cost to 
consumers. As on September 30, 2015, the outstand-
ing debt of DISCOMs stood at INR 80500 crores. The 
scheme also provided for the balance debt of INR 
20000 crore to be re-priced or issued as State guaran-
teed DISCOM bonds, at coupon rates around 3 per 
cent less than the average existing interest rate. This 
should result in savings of about INR 3000 crore in 
annual interest cost through reduction of debt and 
through reduced interest rates on the balance debt.8 
As of March 31, 2017, the bond issued by Rajasthan is  INR 
72090 crores, which is 94.71% of the bonds to be issued 
stipulated at INR 76120 Crores. 
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Table 6: Total outstanding debt to be taken over by the States (INR crores)
 States 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21
Andhra Pradesh 4231 2115.41        
Bihar 1555 777.27        







Haryana 17300 8650        
Jammu & Kashmir 1769 884.388        
Jharkhand 583 292        
Karnataka            
Madhya Pradesh 7568 4622 4622 4622 4622 4621




Punjab 10419 5209.42        
Rajasthan 40265 20133        
Uttar Pradesh 26606 13302.8        
Uttarakhand all dues          
Source: (Basic data), from the Tripartite MoU of the respective States.
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Fig 1a: UDAY Financial Parameters (Progress in reducing AT&C Losses in Rajasthan, 
as of March 31, 2017)
Fig 1b: UDAY Financial Parameters: Progress in reducing ACS-ARR Gap in Rajasthan 
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Figure 2: UDAY in Rajasthan: Progress in Operational Efficiency
(as of March 2017)
  Source: UDAY portal, Govt. of India. https://www.uday.gov.in/state.php?id=4&code=rajasthan
  Source: UDAY portal, Govt. of India. https://www.uday.gov.in/atc_india.php
The progress in reducing the AT&C losses (Aggregate 
Technical and Commercial Loss) by Rajasthan DIS-
COMs is respectively 28.69 per cent by Jaipur Vidyut 
Vitran Nigam Limited, 21.36 per cent by Jodhpur 
Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and 23.53 per cent by 
Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (Figure 1). The 
overall State progress is 24.88 per cent as of March 31, 
2017.
The ACS-ARR gap (INR per unit) which indicates the 
9 As per the UDAY scheme, if the State meet all the financial and operational efficiency parameters, they would get additional/pri-
ority funding through the Central schemes DDUGJY, IPDS, Power Sector Development Fund or such other schemes of MOP and 
commercial viability of the DISCOMs at State level is 
INR 0.65 per unit in Rajasthan; the DISCOM disag-
gregated gap is given in Figure 1b. The UDAY scheme 
emphasises on strengthening the operational efficien-
cy of DISCOMs through many initiatives including 
compulsory Feeder and Distribution Transformer 
metering, providing electricity access to unconnected 
households, distribution of LEDs and smart meter-
ing. However, the progress in operational efficiency 
parameters has not been 100 per cent (Figure 2).9  The 
next section would analyse the impact of these UDAY 
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Table 7: State Finances of Rajasthan: 2017-18 (BE) to 2026-27





















Revenues 15.73 15.91 16.13 16.37 16.65 16.95 17.29 17.66 18.06 18.49
Own Tax Revenue 6.59 6.71 6.84 6.97 7.11 7.25 7.40 7.56 7.73 7.90
Stamps & Registration Fees 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.28
State Excise 1.00 1.05 1.11 1.17 1.23 1.29 1.36 1.43 1.50 1.58
Sales Tax 4.27 4.35 4.44 4.53 4.63 4.72 4.82 4.92 5.02 5.12
Taxes on Vehicles 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.57
Others 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Own Non-Tax Revenue 1.75 1.65 1.55 1.45 1.36 1.28 1.20 1.13 1.06 1.00
Central Transfers 7.38 7.56 7.75 7.95 8.18 8.42 8.68 8.96 9.27 9.60
Share in Central Taxes 4.50 4.75 5.02 5.30 5.59 5.91 6.24 6.59 6.96 7.35
Grants 2.88 2.81 2.73 2.66 2.58 2.51 2.44 2.38 2.31 2.25
Revenue Expenditure 17.36 17.75 17.84 17.93 18.01 18.09 18.16 18.23 18.28 18.32
General Services 5.31 5.62 5.63 5.64 5.64 5.64 5.63 5.61 5.58 5.53
Interest Payment (with 
UDAY)
2.37 2.65 2.63 2.61 2.59 2.56 2.51 2.46 2.39 2.31
Pension 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71 1.71
Others 1.23 1.26 1.29 1.32 1.35 1.38 1.41 1.44 1.48 1.51
Social Services 6.37 6.45 6.53 6.61 6.69 6.78 6.86 6.95 7.03 7.12
Education 3.24 3.39 3.54 3.70 3.87 4.04 4.23 4.42 4.62 4.83
Health 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.84 0.88 0.93 0.97 1.02 1.07 1.12
Others 2.40 2.29 2.18 2.07 1.94 1.81 1.66 1.51 1.35 1.18
Economic Services 5.68 5.68 5.68 5.68 5.67 5.67 5.67 5.67 5.67 5.67
Capital Expenditure 3.09 2.71 2.68 2.66 2.64 2.62 2.59 2.57 2.55 2.53
Revenue Deficit 1.63 1.83 1.71 1.55 1.36 1.14 0.88 0.57 0.22 -0.18
Revenue Deficit (without 
UDAY)
0.18 1.37 1.34 1.27 1.15 0.98 0.76 0.50 0.18 -0.19
Fiscal Deficit 2.99 4.61 4.45 4.27 4.05 3.80 3.51 3.17 2.80 2.38
Fiscal Deficit (without UDAY) 2.99 4.14 4.08 3.98 3.83 3.64 3.39 3.10 2.76 2.37
Outstanding Liabilities 33.61 34.85 35.81 36.49 36.88 36.99 36.79 36.27 35.44 34.26
Outstanding Liabilities -with-
out UDAY
27.30 29.85 31.93 33.55 34.73 35.49 35.84 35.78 35.32 34.26
Source: (Basic data),  Budget Documents of Government of Rajasthan and Authors’ Projections
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Figure 3: Forecast of Revenue Deficit - with and without UDAY in Rajasthan
Figure 4: Forecast of Fiscal Deficit - with and without UDAY in Rajasthan
Source: Authors’ Projections.  (Basic Data), Budget documents, 2017-18, 
Ministry of Finance, Govt. of Rajasthan
Source: Authors’ Projections.  (Basic Data), Budget documents, 2017-18, 
Ministry of Finance, Govt. of Rajasthan
Figure 5: Forecast of Outstanding Liabilities - with and without UDAY in Rajasthan
Source: Authors’ Projections.  (Basic Data), Budget documents, 2017-18,
 Ministry of Finance, Govt. of Rajasthan
reforms on public finances of Rajasthan.
Post UDAY Long Run Fiscal Trend: 2017-18 to 
2026-27 
We have projected fiscal profile of Rajasthan for the 
period from 2017-18 (BE) to 2026-27. This covers 
the period in which restructured power sector debt 
will be amortized. As evident from the Table, based 
on past trends for most components of revenue and 
expenditure, the State debt to GSDP ratio would in-
crease from 33.6 per cent in 2017-18 (BE) to 34.26 per 
cent in 2026-27 (BE). This projection also shows that 
given post UDAY trend in State finances, the govern-
ment of Rajasthan would be able to comply with the 
FRA target only in the year 2025-26 and produce a 
revenue surplus in the fiscal year 2026-27. 
 
It is also to be noted that projected fiscal profile is 
based on a highly conservative fiscal stance as reflect-
ed in the following ratios presented in table 7: 
1) Aggregate revenue receipts to GSDP ratio is pro-
jected to increase from 15.73 per cent of GSDP to 
18.49 per cent of GSDP - an increase of more than 3 
percentage point of GSDP in ten years. Own tax reve-
nue to GSDP ratio is expected to increase from 6.59 to 
7.90 per cent during this period.
2) Revenue expenditure shows an increase from 17.36 
to 18.32 per cent primarily due to the increase in so-
cial sector expenditure. 
3) Capital expenditure is expected to decline from 
3.09 to 2.53 per cent.
The forecasts of revenue deficit, fiscal deficit and out-
standing liabilities are shown in Figure 3, 4 and 5 re-
spectively. 
Conclusion and the Questions Forward
Given these trends in State finances incorporating 
UDAY power debt, the following questions would 
arise. How does one view the long run sustainability 
of State debt and deficits? What is the likely impact 
of the FRBM Committee’s recommendations on the 
finances of Government of Rajasthan where debt to 
GSDP ratio of all States has to be brought down to 20 
percent by 2023 Finally what should be the measure-
able indicator of fiscal prudence at the state level? Is 
it fiscal deficit incorporating UDAY debt or the one 
without UDAY? 
MNRE. If they meet all operational parameters, the State would also be supported through other benefits such as coal swapping, 
coal rationalization and the correction in coal grade slippage, which would gain the State around INR 3000 crores due to these coal 
reforms.
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